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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellee, ] 
v s . ] 
BARRY J. SNYDER, ] 
Defendant-Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 920475CA 
» Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Defendant-Appellant, Barry J . Snyder, submits the following 
Reply Brief in support of his appeal and in response to those issues 
raised by the State in its Brief, and requests this court to grant the 
relief requested on appeal and remand this matter for a fair and 
impartial tr ial . In specific reference to Mr. Snyder 's initial brief, the 
defendant in this brief, in response to the State's brief, expands 
ARGUMENT A relating to the failure of the trial court to grant 
defendants Motion to Suppress statements taken without the 
constitutional protections and safeguards given as set forth in the 
Miranda v . United States case; ARGUMENT B relating to the jury being 
allowed to hear the testimony of Marty Prescott which was a product of 
the illegally obtained statements from the defendant and who was an 
untimely witness pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure; and ARGUMENT C relating to the failure of defendant's 
counsel to request the court to give a cautionary instruction on 
eyewitness testimony. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Issue No. A: 
a. Amendment V of the United States Constitution reads as 
follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand J u r y , except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger ; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, l iberty, or proper ty , without due process of law; nor 
shall private proper ty be taken for public use , without just 
compensation. 
b . Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution reads as 
follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusations against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the r ight to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the r ights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
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c. Amendment VI of the United States Constitution reads as 
follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public tr ial , by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Issue No. B (1-2) 
a. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16(a) and (g) reads 
as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of 
which he has knowledge: . . . 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on 
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in 
o rder for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. . . 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is 
brought to the attention of the court that a par ty has failed to 
comply with this rule , the court may order such par ty to permit 
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the 
par ty from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter 
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
Issue No. C: 
a. The VI Amendment of the United States Constitution appears 
under A. 
b . Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution appears under 
A. 
c. Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution reads in 
par t as follows: 
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. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, l iberty, or 
p roper ty , without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.. 
d. Article I, Sections 7 and 24 of the Utah Constitution reads as 
follows: 
No person shall be deprived of life, l iberty, or p roper ty , without 
due process of law. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
1. The failure of the lower court to grant defendant 's Motion to 
Suppress "statements" taken in contradiction of the United States 
Supreme Court case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U .S . 436 (1966) tainted 
the entire trial proceeding such that defendant was not afforded a fair 
t r ial . 
Intermixed through the entire trial proceedings are statements 
taken from the defendant in the March 18, 1992, custodial interrogation. 
These statements involved sexual gratification in which the defendant 
had previously been involved. The statements also included his 
confession of acts of self-gratification shortly before the alleged 
"criminal" act occurred. The extent of the use of those statements and 
the hearing of the same by the jury so taints defendant 's r ight to a 
fair and impartial trial that reversal is warranted. 
The lower court 's record is not clear whether it denied 
defendant 's Motion to Suppress all statements made in connection with 
the March 18, 1992, custodial interrogation. (T . 27-28) The court 
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clearly ruled the motion was dismissed for failure to timely file the 
same. (T. 28). However, the record also indicates the trial court had 
determined the warning given to Mr. Snyder was sufficient under 
Miranda thereby extinguishing any need for an evidentiary hearing. 
The lower court 's statements regarding the necessity of such warnings 
are indicative of the court 's opinion, and perhaps rul ing, on the 
Motion. The trial court s tated: 
THE COURT: That you've quoted from the t ranscript 
because this is a—there isn't any dispute that this is a Class One 
police officer, isn' t it? This man—it's one police officer talking 
to another police office that has been through the course, Class 
One, and he's been through, he knows—he knows th is , he's 
somebody that carries a card in his pocket probably, and he's 
asked--he ' s asked to affirm that he unders tands what those r ights 
a r e , and he does affirm that he knows what those r ights a re . 
And secondly, after that , he knows that—he knows also the 
statement about—that—that would be made if they were read to 
him from that card completely, that—that full reading would say, 
do you want to talk to us now. I think that—I think that the 
proper interpretation is that that he was given his Miranda 
warning. 
And so I think that it would be a useless act for this Court 
now to go ahead and have a suppression hearing to introduce 
evidence that ' s only going to reproduce that that has been 
stipulated to as the facts as far as the statement is concerned. 
(T . 27). 
The trial court incorrectly applied Miranda in this case in 
violation of the defendant's r ights under Amendment V and VI of the 
United States Constitution and of Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. No matter what the status of the defendant (and the trial 
court assumes that he had the card in his pocket as well as other 
undocumented assumptions), the defendant must be fully given the 
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r ights set forth in Miranda or "a fully effective equivalent." Duckworth 
v . Eagan, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2879 (1989) (quoting from Miranda 384 U . S . 
at 476)(emphasis in original). 
The State incorrectly assumes that the mere mention of "I think 
you know what your r ights a re , probably," (emphasis added, R. 45) 
satisfies Miranda as interpreted in Duckworth. The State !s reliance on 
Duckworth is misplaced. In Duckworth the defendant was given the 
following r ights at 11 a.m. on May 17: 
"Before we ask you any questions, you must unders tand 
your r igh t s . You have the right to remain silent. Anything you 
say can be used against you in court . You have a r ight to talk 
to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to 
have him with you during questioning. You have this r ight to 
the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to 
hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will 
be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court . 
If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer p resen t , 
you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You 
also have the r ight to stop answering at any time until you've 
talked to a lawyer." 
Id. at 2877. Again, some 29 hours later, the police read the following 
form also containing defendants constitutional r ights to the defendant: 
" 1 . Before making this statement, I was advised that I 
have the right to remain silent and that anything I might say may 
or will be used against me in a court of law. 
2. That I have the r ight to consult with an at torney of my 
own choice before saying anything, and that an at torney may be 
present while I am making any statement and throughout the 
course of any conversation with any police officer if I so choose. 
3. That I can stop and request an at torney at any time 
during the course of the taking of any statement or dur ing the 
course of any such conversation. 
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4. That in the course of any conversation I can refuse to 
answer any further questions and remain silent, thereby 
terminating the conversation. 
5. That if I do not hire an at torney, one will be provided 
for me." 
Id. at 2877-2878. 
These warnings given to the defendant in the Duckworth case 
greatly exceed the simple statement given to Mr. Snyder and reflect 
what is required by the statement in Miranda that a "fully effective 
equivalent" warning be given. 
The State has cited no case whatsoever for its proposition that a 
police officer need not be given the full Miranda warning (despite cases 
cited to the contrary by Mr. Snyder ) . Mr. Snyder did not receive the 
requisite warning and cannot be said to have waived something he did 
not receive. 
The State briefly a rgues , without any case authori ty, that Mr. 
Snyder may not have been in custodial interrogation. The officers 
themselves admitted that custodial interrogation was taking place by 
their express statement that "Urn, typically in these situation I have to 
read people their r i gh t s . " (emphasis added, R. 45). 
The Utah and United States1 constitutional r ight against self-
incrimination, as set forth in the Miranda case, protects all statements 
made while in custodial interrogation. As stated by the Utah Supreme 
Court: "That warning (Miranda) is a prerequisite to the admissibility 
of any statement made by a defendant during custodial interrogation." 
State v . Shuman, 639 P.2d 155, 157 (UT 1981) (emphasis added) . 
All statements utilized by the State to either impeach Mr. Snyder, 
to discredit his testimony, or otherwise used in any manner to pollute 
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the impartial mind of the jurors were improper and should have been 
suppressed . 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO 
HEAR THE TESTIMONY OF MARTY PRESCOTT. 
1. The Testimony of Marty Prescott Was Likewise Given in 
Violation of Mr. Snyder 's Miranda Rights and Should Have Been 
Suppressed. 
The State of Utah claims that even if constitutional privileges 
protected by the United States and Utah Supreme courts pursuant to 
the Miranda decision were violated such a violation is only "harmless" 
because fellow officers, Trooper Kyle Bushnell, Trooper Dan Richards 
and Marty Prescott , also heard similar admissions by Barry Snyder . 
The only witness to testify at the time of trial regarding these 
so-called admissions of a sexual problem was Marty Prescott . The 
defendant, Barry Snyder, attempted to call Trooper Kyle Bushnell as 
his witness but was informed the State had told him to go home, and 
counsel for Mr. Snyder decided not to relocate him. (T . 299). 
Trooper Dan Richards was likewise not called. (T . 301). To guess as 
to what they may have said for or against Mr. Snyder is simply 
speculation and not before this court . 
Marty Prescott did testify. The record also indicates that Mr. 
Snyder would not have talked to her about his sexual dreams and 
sexual self-gratification but for the fear which arose from the custodial 
interrogation. At the hearing on the Defendants Motion to Suppress , 
counsel for the defendant s tated: 
And I guess one other point, and the Court should realize, 
these other three people are people who the defendant allegedly 
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told them after the fact, these are the things that the officers 
asked me in the interview and these are the things that we talked 
about. So, their testimony would go in also to—to the topic of 
the interview on the 18th of March. 
(T. 12). 
Fur ther , at the time of tr ial , the witness, Marty Prescott , 
admitted the conversation took place with Mr. Snyder after the 
interrogation with the fellow officers. As stated by Ms. Prescott : 
Q (By Mr. Burbank) When did you initially meet with the 
defendant? 
A It was the following Sunday, after he had been brought in for 
his interviews. (T. 295) (emphasis added) . 
Marty Prescott 's testimony was a result of the interrogation Mr. 
Snyder had received from the fellow officers. Had the interrogation not 
occurred, Ms. Prescott would not have been told the subject matter of 
the interrogation and the responses made by the defendant. Her 
testimony, therefore, is the "fruits" of unlawful police action. Wong 
Sun v . United States, 371 U.S . 471 (1963). Testimony which is the 
result of the Government's own wrongdoing cannot be used by the 
Government to make its case. Id. 
2. The State Failed to Timely Notify Defendant of the Testimony 
of Marty Prescott in order to File Appropriate Pre-tr ial Motions to 
Suppress and/or Obtain Additional Evidence in His Favor. 
The trial court denied Mr. Snyder fs Motion to Suppress the 
testimony of Marty Prescott on the basis said Motion was untimely filed 
and not broad enough to cover her testimony. Interestingly enough, 
the State only notified Mr. Snyder?s counsel by mail of its intent to use 
Marty Prescott as a witness on May 12, 1992, nine days before tr ial . 
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Assuming a three-day mailing time, as allowed by the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, proper notice of additional witnesses was only given 
to Mr. SnyderTs counsel six days prior to tr ial . However, despite the 
prosecutor 's failure to inform timely Mr. Snyder 's counsel of additional 
witnesses, pursuant to Rule 16(a) and (g) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the court allowed the witness. A s t rong facet of 
the State's argument on appeal is that no matter how illegal the 
custodial interrogation of Mr. Snyder, Marty Prescott fs testimony still 
presents the jury with his sexual problems so as to warrant upholding 
the jury verdict . However, her testimony was given in violation of the 
State !s continuing duty to disclose to the defendant the adverse 
information going to be used against him at tr ial . Her testimony was 
also the result of the illegal interrogation. Her testimony was given 
despite the fact she was allowed to listen to approximately 20 t ranscr ipt 
pages of argument regarding the very basic facets of de fendan ts case. 
A s t rong "reasonable likelihood" State v . Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (UT 
1987) exists that but for her testimony, a more reasonable verdict 
would have occurred for the defendant. 
C. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL BY COUNSEL'S FAILURE . . . TO REQUEST THE COURT 
TO GIVE A CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION ON EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY. 
1. A Circumstantial Evidence Jury Instruction Does Not Redeem 
the Verdict From the Failure of the Court to Give a Necessary 
Cautionary Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony. 
The critical issue in this case was based upon the little girls 
"identifying" the defendant and upon what they "saw" the defendant 
doing. Had the statements of the defendant been suppressed and Marty 
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state of the observer . Contrary to much accepted lore, when an 
observer is experiencing a marked degree of s t r e s s , perceptual abilities 
are know to decrease significantly." Id. at 489. 
The State argues that the circumstantial evidence instruction is 
sufficient because (1) the appellant admits coming to the door. 
However, given the improper admittance of "statements t f taken against 
the defendant, Mr. Snyder would never have even testified at the time 
of tr ial , thereby no admission would be present . The State then 
argues (2) one girl identified the defendant. This argument is the 
precise reason for the cautionary instruction. Eyewitness identification 
is a central issue in the case. Id. at 492. Precisely what was seen, 
i . e . naked or not, was a central issue in the case. Id. The court 
should have given the cautionary instruction. As stated by the Utah 
Supreme Court: 
We are convinced tha t , at a minimum, additional judicial 
guidance to the jury in evaluating such testimony is warranted . 
. . (T)o convict a defendant on such evidence without advising 
the jury of the factors that should be considered in evaluating it 
could well deny the defendant due process of law under article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Id. 
Given the s t rong constitutional import of such an instruction (see 
Amendments VI and XIV of the United States Constitution, and Article 
I, sections 7, 12 and 24 of the Utah Constitution), the failure to 
request such an instruction was er ror on the par t of defendants 
counsel (as well as other e r rors listed in Mr. Snyder 's initial br ief ) . A 
s t rong likelihood exists that the jurors may have afforded too much 
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Finally, absent the testimony of Mr. Snyder and Marty Prescot t , 
the children's version of what occurred becomes central to the case. 
Defense counsel did not request and the court did not give a cautionary 
instruction to guide the jury through its weighing of the eyewitness 
accounts of the young gir ls . Mr. Snyder fs right to due process of the 
law was infringed, and the case should be remanded. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l ^ d a y
 0f January , 1993. 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
a. ,o -YllJ.L 
Jari P. Malmberg 
Attorney for Defendant and / " t 
Appellant Kj 
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wanted t o be ai)J e t o p u t on e v i d e n c e of t h e s e e t h e r i c ^ s 
' rn ich a r e i iot t h e a c t in q u e s t i o n ; a n l i u i Llidl i j j j j n in 
• :;ught t o s h o r t e n t h e r n a l ana g e t to t h e nub of tne e v i i e n c i 
by moving i n acl1 ; ance i u iiif i v \ mi! em ,i ii.iyiprpgsfM 
And a3 t h e Cour t has h e a r d a l r e a d y , t h a t b a s i c a l l y 
I U I . 1 . if.i i ., 11*. .tj J t a t c V i s u b m i s s i o n , heq inn i nq ay 
*..-th liat a c t i [ i c a t i c n fh.it U.oy «.eit" IOMI'I u i i in > 
;,cse : t h c r e c : i ' j , ^ h i e h « o u l d - - w u u ! d ana c o u l J ur.ly I eai ' 
11 t i i , ...Ui'uj 
And I guess one other point, and the ,-Giii t aliuuld 
rcaLi.e, these other three people are people who '• he 
etendant alley'.id lj in. 11 ! hew J > " ,n; 1 , MK'.I inn I HP 
thmqa that the officers xsked me in the interview and 
in in1 si II i u inn1 i in t m, i ifiiiiii we t a l k e d a b o u t . S o , rr «i r 
i i ' i l i i&ony would >jw i n a i j o to- t o t h e f;ofnc 1"! l,!u' in 
yixow u*. Lae l i t n sit l a r c h , 
T1I1I I II M 
i , m r L a n k *;o il \ead. 
1L CURBANK , Let Lie m . t b r i e f l y , and I under* -
t anc . ^ t i , , , . - c . . , t«.iJ ' J J ! , i !" r» V-MM , , :it i 
3i • * "\ u rque t h e j a p p r o 3 s i o n h e a r i n g , b u t j u s t for 
ar^ it » i*1 In i ocor ' i M i i n t l i k e t o s t a t e a c oup l e of 
l ac t - j i.ridL a r e a i i t e x e m J thxiiK, n u n r e p r e s e n t i - a ly 
1-i 
THE COURT: That you've cue ted :rom the cr^scri^t 
because this is a--there isn't any dispute that this 13 a 
Class One police officer, isn't it? This nan—it's one 
police officer talking to another police officer that has / 
been through the course, Class One, and he's been through, ,-' 
he knows—he knows this, hefs somebody that carries a card? 
I 
1 
in his pocket probably, and he's asked—he13 asked to I 
1 
affirm that he understands what those rights are, and he j 
does affirm that he knows what those rights are. j 
And secondly, after that, he knows that--lie knows\ 
also the statement about--that—that would be made if they \ 
\ 
were read to him from that card completely, that—that \ 
full reading would say, do you want to talk to us now. I j 
think that—I think that the proper interpretation is that / 
i 
that he was given his Miranda warning. i 
And 30 I think that it would be a useless act for 
this Court now to go ahead and have a suppression hearing 
to introduce evidence that's only going to reproduce that 
that has been stipulated to as the facts as far as the 
statement is concerned. 
The motion does not—is not broad enough to cover 
all the witnesses that the State may call later on, and so 
that again is a surplusage that the Court cannot consider 
at this time. 
So the Court further finds that there is no 
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surprise by the transcript because the def ondan--•- :hc 
cranscript is a reproduction of the tape that*3 deen 
observed by the defendant and the defendant's attorney 
prior to the time of that transcript being niade, so the 
Court finds that you had—are charged with having !;nowledge 
of the contents of that, prior to the transcript coining. 
So, the Court finds that there1s no real surprise. 
All right. 3o, the excuse—the Court finds 
there's no merit in the excuse for not giving a notice 
within the five days. All right. 
Now, having made that determination, have each one 
of you prepared any proposed instructions that I need to 
13
 I look at? 
14
 I MR. 3URBAKK: I haven't prepared any yet, your 
15
 I Honor, but I will prepare some instruction. It is our 
intent to proceed with trial, we anticipate the trial 
starts at 9:00 o'clock on Thursday morning. 
We have, as the Court is aware and Mr. Malouf, 
there's two children that will be involved in testifying, 
and I've been trying to determine how we can do that; there 
are videotapes of these children. 
I guess there's a couple of ways we could do it. 
One is, is that v/e could put these children in a place 
outside of the defendant, if that causes them fear and 
intimidation, and still be subject to cross-examine and 
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1
 I - --vi -^= -hat before March 17th, 1392? * x^L .i-jm
2
 A Yes. 
3
 2 And have you heard hint use that term after 
4
 liarch 17 th, 19 S 2? 
5 A Yes. I have* 
6
 Q After March 17 th, 1992, did you have a conversa-
7
 tion with the defendant concerning the incident that's 
8 presently before the bar? 
9 A Yes. We had quite a few discussions after, 
10 Q And during: those discussions, did the defendant 
11 tell you what he did on this day? 
12 A Yes. He did. 
13 Q And could you briefly just tell the members of 
14 the jury what the defendant told you and when, initially? 
15 MR. MALOCF: Objection. That's a compound 
16 question. Kant better foundation than that, your Honor. 
17 Q (By Mr. Burbank) W h e n — 
18
 MR. BURBANK: That's a fair objection, your 
19 Honor. 
20 THE COURT: The objection's sustained. 
21 Q (By Mr, 3urbank) When did you initially meet 
22 ;ith the da fondant? 
23 A It was tha following Sunday, after he had been 
24 brought in for his interviews. 
25 Q And where did that meeting take place? 
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MALOUF: Thank you. 
just described, 
BURBANK: Thank you, Marty. 
COURT: All right. You can 8tap down. 
BURBANK: No other witnesses. 
MALCUT: Ke'may have a rebuttal witness 
• 
call Kyle Bushnell, your 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: He's 
299 
Honor. 
not here, your I 
•t go 
did 
Thank 
-
Honor. 
,u
:
.. -ALCUF: Vour Honor, t h i s is one of the 
J t a t c ' j /y iucSGts t h a t was under the s e q u e s t r a t i o n o r d e r , 
*»e have not agreed to excuse hira, we assuraed he was here 
and we need hira for our r e b u t t a l c a s e . 
^R. CUREAliK. do w a s n ' t c a l l e d as a w i t n e s s , 
your Honor. 
;<1R. ivALOUF: He was i d e n t i f i e d as a w i t n e s s , 
; o u r Honor, 
*-*K. LURLANK: i f counse l wanted him, he could 
have c a l l e r hiir* as a w i t n e s s , he should have subpoenaed him. 
THIS COURT: Well, bu t he wasn't c a l l e d , was he? 
MR. 2UABAMK: 2*0. 
ioK. .iALOUF: Well, we—he wasn't called, that's 
right, because we didn't call hixa on our case in chief, 
we don't need hira until we get to—we're entitled to call 
witnesses to rebutt their rebuttal case. 
I don1t know whether he was here an hour ago or 
not anyhow, I just know that he was subpoenaed to *:;e here 
and he was here, and we have every right, since the case 
sat the way it was, to assuiae that he would be li^ re. 
xliil COURT; I don't--was he one of then that was 
here earlier? 
HR. 3URLARR; Kyle Z-ushnell was here this 
rooming, ^ our Honor, and he— 
HR. vlrxLOUF: He was here and identified. 
JJJ 
*!R. 2UREANK: May I speak, Counsel? 
MR. I-^ LOUF: Go ahead. 
ill;. BURBAKK: Thank you. 
Kyle Bushnell was a witness that was here this 
morning. The State indicated in its case in chief that 
oorae of these witnesses wouldn't be called. Based on the 
way the evidence has come in at this point in time, we 
didn't feel it was necessary to call Trooper Bushnell, nor 
lid we 'feel it was necessary to call Trooper Dan Richards, 
;,nd I believe Trooper Bushnell at thit time, and Trooper 
Pichards left. 
THE COURT: And I 3mow that— 
MR. EUR3ANK: And I assume if counsel wants to 
call him on the phone, he's probably available somewhere. 
I have no objection to that. 
MR. KALCUF; Your Honor, I'm—• 
MR. BURBAKK: But I'm not here to do Counsel's 
case, that's not my job. If Counsel wants to subpoena 
witnesses, he knows, unde:r the rules, he has to subpoena 
witnesses. 
MR. MALOUF: T;ell, your Honor, the State 
disclosed their witnesses, they asked permission to excuse 
any witness they excused already. 
MR. 5UR3ANK: That had testified. 
MR. MALCUF: Which we were willing to give. 
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